Disjunctives, God, and Naturalism: Just Something to Consider


Today I spoke with a student about the existence of God. He had read an essay I put together last year concerning the Damascene Cosmological argument. His ultimate response was, “Well this is just the argument of ignorance.” In other words, even though I had shown naturalism to be illogical and unreasonable, his response was, “Well we haven’t discovered everything about the universe yet.” Now, there are three problems with such a thinking: (1) it ignores the importance of disjunctive arguments, (2) Cosmological arguments aren’t arguments from ignorance (unless purely evidential), and (3) pleading ignorance in order to justify atheism is tantamount to a giant leap of faith (to be fair, the student is a Deist and not an atheist, but he argues that one cannot prove the existence of God, something I partially agree with if we are speaking about purely evidential proof).

First, we must understand the importance of disjunctive propositions when dealing with cosmological arguments. In logic, a disjunctive proposition deals with alternates, generally in scenarios where it is necessarily either/or. Imagine we are looking at a ball and I say, “It is either red or it is blue.” This is not a strict disjunctive because it could be neither red nor blue, but green. If we say the ball isn’t blue, that doesn’t automatically mean it is red, for it could be another color. There is another option available. A true disjunctive would be if we looked at a cat to determine if it is dead or alive. If I prove the cat is not dead, then by necessity the cat must be alive. If I prove the cat is not alive, then by necessity it must be dead. There is no third option. Thus, we have a true either/or.

When we approach cosmological arguments we are dealing with pure disjunctives. The ultimate question of “What caused all things to exist” will either be a natural answer (that is, nature did it and there is no God) or a supernatural answer (that is, God did it and atheism isn’t a proper position). This is a strict either/or and cannot allow for a third option. Thus, if one is shown to be irrational or false in all possible worlds, then the alternative is necessarily true even in the absence of physical evidence. That is what is meant by “disjunctive propositions.” Thus, in cosmological arguments for the existence of God, if it can be shown that naturalism is logically untenable in all possible worlds and it’s impossible for it to work as an explanation for the origin of everything, then by default Theism must be true, even if we have no evidence to prove Theism.

With the above in mind, we can proceed in the argument, showing that cosmological arguments aren’t arguments from ignorance. Sadly, due to pseudo-philosophers writing atheistic articles, the argument of ignorance (or argumentum ad ignorantiam) has been misapplied and misunderstood as to what it covers. The incorrect understand and application has generally used the argument under a de facto epistemology of empiricism. The argument has been applied that to believe in x even if there is a lack of evidence for x and to attempt to have others believe in x without evidence for the validity of x is an argument from ignorance. But such an application is silly, for we have no way to prove (empirically) that what we are experiencing right now isn’t a dream.

Assume that a mad philosopher has found a way to put all humans in to a trance-like state, but cause us to dream together. Thus, we’re in a Matrix-like situation where we think we’re experiencing reality, but in reality we’re actually asleep. Any empirical arguments used to disprove this theory would, in fact, be circular. Therefore, not everything we believe has to have an empirical foundation. Or, as Paul Boghossian argues in Fear of Knowledge,

“Not every belief needs to be supported by some independent item of information that would constitute evidence in its favor: some beliefs are intrinsically credible or self-evident. Philosophers disagree about the range of propositions that they think are self-evident in this sense, and very few believe that their number is large. But ever since Descartes first formulated his famous cognito argument, philosophers have been persuaded that at least some propositions are self-evident. What non-circular evidence could one adduce, for example, for the believe that one is currently conscious?”

What Boghossian is arguing is if we say, “Well I currently see, I currently think, and I currently feel” all assume that such phenomenological experiences aren’t, in fact, illusions. Thus, the empiricist must assume that life as we know it isn’t an illusion in order to prove that life as we know it isn’t an illusion! This would fall under how many atheists have defined the “argument of ignorance.”

A better understanding and how the argument should properly be understood is when people say, “Well you can’t prove x wrong, therefore it must be true.” The fallacy is that just because x can’t be proven false doesn’t necessarily mean that x is true. To use Bertrand Russell’s famous example, we can imagine a China tea cup in orbit between the earth and the moon. Anyone utilizing the argument of ignorance would say that because we can’t prove it’s not true we must therefore assume that there is an actual tea cup orbiting the earth. Now, it could very well be that a tea cup orbits the earth, but our ability to know so wouldn’t be based upon the fact that we can’t disprove it. For instance, I can’t disprove there is an invisible gnome living in my backyard, but that doesn’t mean there is actually an invisible gnome living in my backyard.

How, then, do cosmological arguments fall under the argument of ignorance? The reality is that they don’t. To assert that we know certain things about logic, physics, mathematics, and physical science and that all of these discoveries lead us to believe that naturalism is false isn’t the argument from ignorance. If it were then our entire judicial system would collapse as often times we are simply left with the probability or likelihood of a person’s guilt based on the evidence, though there is a possibility that at a later date evidence could pop up that exonerates the accused. Does this mean we shouldn’t vote for his guilt? Of course not; we must make decisions on the evidence (not just physical evidence, but logical evidence as well) before us.

The same is true when it comes to the cosmological argument; when we point to the improbability of naturalism, or how naturalism is an unlikely explanation (or, logically speaking, an impossible explanation), and conclude that God must exist, we are not making an argument from ignorance. We’re looking at what is currently available to us and making a decision. Likewise, when it comes to logical impossibilities, it is doubtful that we will discover something that overturns what is logically impossible (we’ll never find something that can violate the law of non-contradiction). Thus, if an actual infinite regress of events is impossible, then naturalism can never be a proper explanation, therefore God necessarily exists.

Finally, to say, “Well one day we could discover how the universe occurred naturally, so there’s no reason to believe in God” is akin to a six day creationist saying, “Well someday we could find out that carbon 14 dating and all of evolutionary theory is wrong.” While that is actually possible, it’s not probable or likely. The same is true when atheists say that one day all of physics, mathematics, and logic could be overturned in order to give credence to naturalism; certainly it could occur, but it’s just not likely.

In other words, at such a level atheism becomes an irrational leap of faith, a belief that defies all the evidence against it and keeps on going. While such leaps are sometimes justified, when your entire belief system is a leap of faith then your entire belief system is irrational, that is, most likely not based in reality.

Hopefully the reader will now see that cosmological arguments are not always arguments from ignorance (though some poorly constructed arguments can fall into this category, it is not true that cosmological arguments are necessarily categorized as arguments from ignorance). If they are not arguments from ignorance then they are still logically valid arguments, free from a fallacy, and therefore should be properly dealt with rather than tossed aside.

Damascene Cosmology – On the Mutability of Nature


First Sub-Premise – “If they are mutable, then they are created”

Before explaining how things that are mutable are also created, we should first seek to understand what it means to change or be mutable. To change means to change in one’s nature or being, that is, to get better or worse. A rock can be bigger or smaller. One rock might be bigger than the other. A beast can beget another beast, so that within the nature of the beast there is the ability to multiply. For instance, two rabbits can form another rabbit so there are three rabbits. Within the nature of “rabbit” we then see the ability to change; today there might be 3 rabbits, tomorrow there might be 300 rabbits, and the day after there might be 150 rabbits.

Change also occurs to free-will creatures. A human can become more or less good. They can embark on actions that cause them to have a greater moral standing or a lower moral standing. They can also increase and decrease in wisdom. The same stands true for angels who can also make free-will choices to be good or bad and who can also increase or decrease in wisdom. This shows that both physical (animals) and non-physical (rational) entities can be subject to change in some form.

Regardless of the type of change, the key factor in change is movement. If two rabbits become three rabbits, then there was a movement that caused the third rabbit to come about. Thus, a movement caused the change.  With free will creatures who become wiser, it is their desire to become wise that can cause the change in their wisdom. For non-sentient creatures, there is something else that causes them to move.

The implications of movement causing change would indicate that objects that change are not eternal. For instance, if x moves y, then y cannot be eternal. The reason is the chance indicates that y is not perfect; in some way it multiplied, it increased, it decreased, it became better, and so on. An example is if Peter taught Paul that it was morally wrong to steal. In this case, Paul was moved by Peter and increased in his moral knowledge and became more moral. Such knowledge and morality were not inherent within Paul’s existence to begin with. If Paul existed for eternity, then we must wonder how he would ever obtain the knowledge that Peter taught him or why Paul did not have said knowledge to begin with.

For the naturalist, the idea that mutable items indicate a creation is problematic. The reason is that energy, which is said to be eternal, is quite mutable. Energy comes in different degrees and can take different forms. The energy released from a car accident is smaller than the energy released from an atomic bomb. Matter is also found in different forms and degrees (there is more matter in you than in an ant).

If it is true that what is mutable is created, then naturalism lacks a proper standing. Naturalism would be untenable as all material elements are complex and therefore subject to change. The only way a naturalist can avoid the conclusion that God is the unmoved mover is to claim that an infinite regress is possible. Continue reading

An addendum to the “Damascene Ontological Argument”


I recently explored the Cosmological Argument of St. John of Damascus (or what I would now call the “Damascene Ontological Argument”) and have realized something in the argument that needs clarification, namely, how could God remain unchanged in light of the Incarnation? (Much thanks to my friend Vic and commenter CK for bringing this problem up)

My first proposition looks like this:

(1) All things are either created or uncreated
(1a) If they are created then they are changeable
(1b) If they are uncreated then they are unchangeable

For God to be eternal, this means that He must be unchangeable, but how can this be so in light of the Incarnation? Wouldn’t this indicate “change”?

St. John sheds light on what he means by “change” when he argues that an angel or human can “change” by doing something moral or immoral. A human can have another human, thus increasing the quantity of humans, indicating a change. A human also changes physically. Thus, humans change. Christ, who is God, was also a human. The question then becomes, how could Christ be both man and God, but not change? If Christ didn’t change, then He isn’t human. If He did change, then He isn’t God.

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The Cosmological Argument of St. John of Damascus


St. John of Damascus

For those unfamiliar with philosophical terms, “cosmological”  simply means “an explanation of the beginning.” So to say something is a “cosmological argument” merely means, “It’s an argument about why everything exists.”

I have been reading bits and pieces of St. John of Damascus’ book The Orthodox Faith. I’m currently re-working my way through Peter Kreeft’s Socratic Logic mostly so I can read the first part of St. John’s book Fountain of Knowledge (I’m rusty on my terms). In reading over the third chapter of The Orthodox Faith, St. John presents a solid cosmological argument:

All things, that exist, are either created or uncreated. If, then, things are created, it follows that they are also wholly mutable. For things, whose existence originated in change, must also be subject to change, whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable. For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence, that is to say, must have opposite properties: who, then, will refuse to grant that all existing things, not only such as come within the province of the senses, but even the very angels, are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world, I mean angels and spirits and demons, are subject to changes of will, whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness, whether a struggle or a surrender; while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction, of increase and decrease, of quality and of movement in space. Things then that are mutable are also whollycreated. But things that are created must be the work of some maker, and the maker cannot have been created. For if he had been created, he also must surely have been created by some one, and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. TheCreator, then, being uncreated, is also wholly immutable. And what could this be other than Deity?

St. John had a classical education, so he puts the argument in the form of a syllogism. If we were to break that syllogism down it would read something like this:

(1) All things are either created or uncreated
(1a) If they are created then they are changeable
(1b) If they are uncreated then they are unchangeable
(2) All beings that fall within our experience are changeable
(3) All of these things have therefore been created and require a creator
(4) The creator, by logical necessity, would have to be uncreated and therefore unchangeable (we can’t have an infinite regression of “p created q who created r, ad infinitum“).
(5) By definition, such a creator would be called God

Logically, this is a solid argument. The premises follow one another and therefore provide a proper conclusion. If something is changeable, then it is created and requires a creator. If something is unchangeable, then it is not created and therefore does not require a creator.

Though the argument is valid, the question then becomes if the premises and conclusion are true. In a valid argument, the conclusion logically follows the premises, thus if the premises are true and the argument is valid, then the conclusion is also true.

So let us look at the premises:

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