My first proposition looks like this:

(1) All things are either created or uncreated
(1a) If they are created then they are changeable
(1b) If they are uncreated then they are unchangeable

For God to be eternal, this means that He must be unchangeable, but how can this be so in light of the Incarnation? Wouldn’t this indicate “change”?

St. John sheds light on what he means by “change” when he argues that an angel or human can “change” by doing something moral or immoral. A human can have another human, thus increasing the quantity of humans, indicating a change. A human also changes physically. Thus, humans change. Christ, who is God, was also a human. The question then becomes, how could Christ be both man and God, but not change? If Christ didn’t change, then He isn’t human. If He did change, then He isn’t God.

The problem with such a critique is that it assumes the Divine nature and human nature somehow fused in the Incarnation. This, however, did not occur. A “third thing” was not created when Christ became human, likewise, though the fullness of the Deity dwelt within Christ, the whole of the Deity (that is, all three persons of the Holy Trinity) were not within the flesh. Thus, it was the person of Christ becoming human and not the whole of God becoming human.

The best way to explain this is to look at two different illustrations.

The first example summarizes the way the objection is formed (“how could God remained unchanged in the Trinity?”):

The problem with the above view is that it puts the wholeness of the Deity into the Incarnation. This leaves us pondering how Christ could have been raised from the dead by the Spirit or how God could have forsaken Christ on the cross when all three were actually present in the flesh. It should also be noted that if the above example truly represented what occurred in the Incarnation, then we are left with a changeable God.

However, the appropriate view looks more like this:

Notice that in the above example, only the Son took on the human nature and not the Divine nature (located in the middle of the three ovals). Thus, the person of Christ added a nature, which does not indicate a change in the Divine nature nor in the other two persons of the Holy Trinity. Thus, God did not change in the Incarnation.

But does the fact that the Word became flesh indicate a change in who He is? John 17:5 (along with other passages) would indicate the opposite. In John 17:5, Jesus lays claim to pre-existence with the Father. Though Christ took on the human nature, such a nature did not change Christ’s personality or who He was as Christ (whereas much of what we humans encounter in this life can change our personalities or who we are as individuals).

In fact, the ancient “Hymn to the Only Begotten Son” by St. John Chrysostom reads:

St. John of Damascus

For those unfamiliar with philosophical terms, “cosmological”  simply means “an explanation of the beginning.” So to say something is a “cosmological argument” merely means, “It’s an argument about why everything exists.”

I have been reading bits and pieces of St. John of Damascus’ book The Orthodox Faith. I’m currently re-working my way through Peter Kreeft’s Socratic Logic mostly so I can read the first part of St. John’s book Fountain of Knowledge (I’m rusty on my terms). In reading over the third chapter of The Orthodox Faith, St. John presents a solid cosmological argument:

All things, that exist, are either created or uncreated. If, then, things are created, it follows that they are also wholly mutable. For things, whose existence originated in change, must also be subject to change, whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable. For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence, that is to say, must have opposite properties: who, then, will refuse to grant that all existing things, not only such as come within the province of the senses, but even the very angels, are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world, I mean angels and spirits and demons, are subject to changes of will, whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness, whether a struggle or a surrender; while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction, of increase and decrease, of quality and of movement in space. Things then that are mutable are also whollycreated. But things that are created must be the work of some maker, and the maker cannot have been created. For if he had been created, he also must surely have been created by some one, and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. TheCreator, then, being uncreated, is also wholly immutable. And what could this be other than Deity?

St. John had a classical education, so he puts the argument in the form of a syllogism. If we were to break that syllogism down it would read something like this:

(1) All things are either created or uncreated
(1a) If they are created then they are changeable
(1b) If they are uncreated then they are unchangeable
(2) All beings that fall within our experience are changeable
(3) All of these things have therefore been created and require a creator
(4) The creator, by logical necessity, would have to be uncreated and therefore unchangeable (we can’t have an infinite regression of “p created q who created r, ad infinitum“).
(5) By definition, such a creator would be called God

Logically, this is a solid argument. The premises follow one another and therefore provide a proper conclusion. If something is changeable, then it is created and requires a creator. If something is unchangeable, then it is not created and therefore does not require a creator.

Though the argument is valid, the question then becomes if the premises and conclusion are true. In a valid argument, the conclusion logically follows the premises, thus if the premises are true and the argument is valid, then the conclusion is also true.

So let us look at the premises:

(1) All things are either created or uncreated
(1a) If they are created then they are changeable
(1b) If they are uncreated then they are unchangeable

(1) seems to be self-evident; something either is created or isn’t created. There cannot be an in between. The question then becomes, “Are all things that are created changeable?” The challenge would rarely be to (1), but rather to (1a). To understand how (1a) is true, we must first look to see what St. John means by the word “changeable.” Most likely, St. John was using the Aristotelean idea that something can develop or change overtime. An acorn changes into an oak tree (though the nature of “oak” remains the same). An infant human changes into an adult human, though the essence of “human” remains the same. So when St. John says “changeable” he is not referring to the nature or essence of individuals, but rather the individual itself. That is, inherent within the nature of a species is that the species will change as time goes on. The same stands true for matter as matter changes all the time. What is a piece of paper tomorrow may be broken down and reshaped into a paper bag tomorrow. Thus, in our experience, everything in the universe is changeable, which means everything was created (or had a beginning).

St. John even argues that among humans or angels, change comes about by free choice. That we can increase or decrease our corruption or we can increase or decrease in size by people. The constant flux of the human population shows a change occurring within the population.

Such change occurs because of movement. Something caused the movement. Such movement is caused by unintelligent forces (e.g. an asteroid hits another asteroid, causing them to move in different directions) or by intelligent movement (a person drives a car from point a to point b). In either case, when change occurs there is a movement prior to such change that caused the change.

But what about (1b)? If we found something that did not have “changeable” as part of its nature, would it follow that such a being is uncreated? If something is unchangeable, then by definition it must have always existed. If it came into existence at some point, then there was a change. There was a time when it did not exist, but now a time where it does exist, and therefore a change has occurred.

Some might want to argue for the eternality of energy and matter, thus putting them under (1b), but this is illogical. We see that energy and matter change all the time and are found in different forms. If they are changing, then they are created (because to change is to move and to move requires an action prior to movement). We could ask, “Then who moved God,” but even if we accept the answer, we’re left moving backwards until we find an unmoved mover. Such a progression cannot go on for infinity because an infinite regress is impossible.

Thus, at some point there was a mover that created. When something is capable of change, that means it has been moved. Since matter and energy precede humans, but are also unintelligent, we know that humans did not move matter and energy and matter and energy did not move on their own will. Thus, they had to be moved by an unmoved mover. This mover is who we call God.

(For a deeper explanation of how material cannot be eternal, go here and here).

(2) All beings that fall within our experience are changeable

This is another self-evident proposition. We have not experience any being (other than God) who is unchangeable. Were we to meet a population of aliens who claimed they were unchangeable, the fact that such a population existed, meaning there were offspring, would contradict such a claim.

(3) All of these things have therefore been created and require a creator

This is almost a conclusion within the syllogism, or a “pre-conclusion.” Since (1a) and (2) are logically sound, (3) follows. Since everything we experience, including ourselves, is changeable, it follows that all these things were created.

(4) The creator, by logical necessity, would have to be uncreated and therefore unchangeable (we can’t have an infinite regression of “p created q who created r, ad infinitum“).

(4) follows from premise (1b), that since God is unchangeable, He is without need of a Creator. Some might argue that this is special pleading. Special pleading looks like this:

1)    Joe accepts standards S and applies them in other circumstances C
2)    Joe is in circumstance C
3)    Therefore, Joe is exempt from S

Or, in an easier to understand example:

Richard: “You have to prove empirically all of your beliefs.”

Bill: “But why haven’t you done so?”

Richard: “Because I don’t need to, I’m the one challenging you!”

That is a case of special pleading. It is saying that one thing is absolutely untrue in one circumstance, but then to reneg on that statement once you find yourself in that circumstance.

To the atheist, when looking at God, they argue that saying God is eternal and therefore uncreated is a case of special pleading; if they can’t say material is eternal and uncreated, then we can’t say God is eternal and uncreated. They believe that God and material are in the same circumstance and therefore the same rules apply.

But such an argument ignores what St. John is saying. As (1a) shows us, anything that changes is created. Matter changes. Therefore, matter cannot be uncreated. For the theist to be guilty of special pleading, he would have to put God in the same circumstance as material, but he does not. Material (energy) changes, therefore it’s created. There’s nothing to lead us to believe that God changes (and, in fact, logically we have to believe that the ultimate Mover of all things does not change), therefore there’s nothing to lead us to believe that God is created.

For a more complex argument on this, I turn to a previous explanation I gave in a debate with an atheist (if you don’t care about technical explanations, or the above common sense defense was enough, simply skip the quote):

Special pleading deals more with ethics than it does metaphysics. Regardless, even if we apply this to a metaphysical application, it still doesn’t work in the case of God vs. naturalism. The reason is God doesn’t meet premise (2). God doesn’t fall under C, therefore He is not subject to S. Naturalism has certain rules to follow (rules you didn’t contest), one of which being that it simply cannot be an infinite series of events. Since God is not found in C, He is not subject to S.

We know this because the naturalistic universe is (i) material, (ii) subject to decay, (iii) finite, (iv) impersonal, (v) unintelligent, etc. That would constitute the first circumstance (C1). God, however, is (vi) immaterial, (vii) incorruptible, (viii) infinite, (ix) personal, and (x) intelligent. This would constitute the second circumstance (C2).

S will differ depending on the circumstance. Thus, S1 corresponds to C1 and S2corresponds to C2. It is illogical to take S1, show that being A violates S1, all the while knowing that A is in C2 and not C1. In order to properly show that A is violating S1 (thus, begetting the special pleading fallacy), one must first show that Aexists within C2.

For our debate then, you would have to show that God is under the same circumstances as the naturalistic world. If you accomplished this, however, you would have to use a definition other than God, in which case you’re using a straw man fallacy. In other words, the only possible way you could justify “special pleading” when it comes to God being eternal and the universe not being eternal is if you were to commit a logical fallacy yourself; two logical fallacies don’t make a right.

In all of this, however, you didn’t address the attacks against naturalism. Even if all of the above were false and these were a case of special pleading, this would lead us into extreme skepticism about God and the natural world. We would be in a worse situation than before, so your arguments really accomplish nothing for the case of naturalism. It’s simply a red herring.

Thus, preposition (4) logically follows the other premises and is not a case of special pleading, so we can accept it as true.

(5) By definition, such a creator would be called God

(5) is the conclusion and since the premises are true, the conclusion is true (since it logically follows the premises). One of the definitions of “God” is that He is without beginning, that is, uncreated.

Like other cosmological arguments, such as the Kalaam Cosmological Argument or Leibnizian cosmology, such an argument is not meant to bring someone to Christ or to prove Christianity. In fact, the Kalaam argument is actually an argument that was perfected by Muslim philosophers. The point of such arguments is merely to show people that God does exist, it is not meant to be evangelical, but rather apologetical.

In conclusion, it seems that St. John’s cosmological argument is an excellent argument for the existence of God. I find it to be a bit easier to understand and argue than the Kalaam argument or Leibnitz argument (though both are still excellent arguments). If nothing else, it is nice to have yet another cosmological argument out there for consideration.

Issue 7 – Does God need “special pleading” to avoid the arguments against naturalism?

Me:

It is necessarily true that in any universe where matter decays it must also have a beginning. Thus, even if we say there was something prior to the universe, we’re still left with the problem of infinite regress – at some point, there has to be something beginning everything.

Atheist:

Except for God right? He gets a special pass.

That would be the Special Pleading Logical Fallacy i think

Me:

I thought I did a good job explaining why God is not subject to the problems listed in the original post. As I stated:

If the universe requires a beginning, then it requires an immaterial, eternal, all-knowing, all-powerful mind to bring the physical world about. All of these would be part of the nature of the being that caused the universe, thus satisfying the requirement of premise (1). The universe, as it is, fits none of the above descriptors, thus requiring an explanation.

The special pleading fallacy only occurs when an object is put under the same circumstances, but is not held to those circumstances. Thus, as follows:

1)    Joe accepts standards S and applies them in other circumstances C
2)    Joe is in circumstance C
3)    Therefore, Joe is exempt from S

A better example is if you believe that everyone who speeds, regardless of reason, deserves a speeding ticket. You get caught speeding and get a ticket. You turn around and say you don’t deserve the ticket because you can’t afford it right now. That is special pleading.

Special pleading deals more with ethics than it does metaphysics. Regardless, even if we apply this to a metaphysical application, it still doesn’t work in the case of God vs. naturalism. The reason is God doesn’t meet premise (2). God doesn’t fall under C, therefore He is not subject to S. Naturalism has certain rules to follow (rules you didn’t contest), one of which being that it simply cannot be an infinite series of events. Since God is not found in C, He is not subject to S.

We know this because the naturalistic universe is (i) material, (ii) subject to decay, (iii) finite, (iv) impersonal, (v) unintelligent, etc. That would constitute the first circumstance (C1). God, however, is (vi) immaterial, (vii) incorruptible, (viii) infinite, (ix) personal, and (x) intelligent. This would constitute the second circumstance (C2).

S will differ depending on the circumstance. Thus, S1 corresponds to C1 and S2 corresponds to C2. It is illogical to take S1, show that being A violates S1, all the while knowing that A is in C2 and not C1. In order to properly show that A is violating S1 (thus, begetting the special pleading fallacy), one must first show that A exists within C2.

For our debate then, you would have to show that God is under the same circumstances as the naturalistic world. If you accomplished this, however, you would have to use a definition other than God, in which case you’re using a straw man fallacy. In other words, the only possible way you could justify “special pleading” when it comes to God being eternal and the universe not being eternal is if you were to commit a logical fallacy yourself; two logical fallacies don’t make a right.

In all of this, however, you didn’t address the attacks against naturalism. Even if all of the above were false and these were a case of special pleading, this would lead us into extreme skepticism about God and the natural world. We would be in a worse situation than before, so your arguments really accomplish nothing for the case of naturalism. It’s simply a red herring.

Issue 8 – Can there be a naturalistic cause?

Me:

So yes, it is necessarily true that the universe has a finite beginning point in which time, matter, energy, etc came into existence..

Atheist:

Yup…we call it the Big Bang. But that doesn’t necesarily mean there was nothing there before. And in a situation wherein there is no space/time then surely any interpretation we place on it is bound to fail. Infinity is a measure of time and space (or concept of such), but if time and space don’t exist? Can we apply infinity?

Me:

This actually feeds right into my argument. If there were a “time” where space and time didn’t exist, then yes, infinity couldn’t go back to that point. But this actually harms a belief in the physical universe. In order for material to exist, there has to be at least space (I would argue for time as well, based on the arguments I gave in my previous response). If there is no space then there is no material, So this time you refer to would require an immaterial existence that caused a material existence.

Issue 9 – Does it matter that some scientists believe in an infinite universe?

Me:

The bigger problem is that scientifically this can’t work

Atheist:

I think the great many highly educated minds that have looked in great detail of this issue would perhaps have a different opinion. I hadn’t realized you had a working and detailed professional knowledge of current big bang theory.

I’m sure Steven Hawking would be interested to see your thesis.

Me:

Talk about logical fallacies! It’s a false appeal to authority. “Because person/people A believe subject S, S is true because A says it is true.” A person’s authority on a subject says little to nothing about the truthfulness of a certain belief. It might say a bit about qualifications or epistemic justification for a belief, but it says nothing about the truthfulness of a belief.

You appeal to these authorities, but offer no retort to anything I said. This is a logical fallacy in that anything I say, no matter how brilliant or detailed it may be, will simply be brushed aside because there are others who disagree. If this were the case, if this is how science is to operate, scientific progress would be impossible.

As a side note, I’m using some of Hawking’s arguments on how the Big Bang proves the universe has a finite beginning. However, he came out with his Quantum Gravity Model. The problem, which even Hawking admits, is that his theory relies on imaginary numbers in order to work. Once we plug in real, definable, testable numbers, his model falls apart. In other words, the closest explanation we have on how the universe could exist naturally can only work if we plug imaginary numbers into an equation. In fact, in his book Brief History of Time, he says, “When one goes back to the real time in which we live, however, there will still appear to be singularities.” (pg. 139).

So I’m not really concerned with what they say; if they attempt to show that the universe is eternal or infinite (which, I can’t think of a single mathematician or physicist that does, hence the recent number of theories attempting to find a way to have a closed system, but an infinite universe), then they’re wrong. Their multiple attempts (all of which have utterly failed) to show how the system is closed, but infinite is a back-handed insult on my own position; apparently there’s enough evidence in my court that they have to come up with theories to explain away the evidence.

Issue 10 – What of the second law of thermodynamics?

Me:

In short, the universe should be “winding down” as it reaches its equilibrium, indicating that it had to be “wound up” at some point.

Atheist:

And it is. Check out the universe heat death theory.

Me:

Exactly my point. We’re moving toward equilibrium, which poses a problem for a belief in an infinite universe.

Issue 11 – Is there a double standard in the argument?

Me:

That’s really an absurd argument. It ignores the premise given – everything that has a cause began to exist.

Atheist:

Its OK for God to be outside time (whatever that actually means) and still somehow be able to function, but its not OK for the origins of our universe to be outside time (which they are by definition).

Double standard there i think.

Me:

It’s not a double standard at all. I must ask – did you even read my criticisms against a belief in an infinite universe? In order for material to exist, there must be time and space. In order for a mind, or immaterial being, to exist, time and space are not a requirement.

I stated:

We all know that the Big Bang is a series of events, or at least begins a series of events and – under your argument – was preceded by a series of events. The problem with this is that it’s mathematically impossible. If I want to get from 1-10, but there is an infinite number of events preceding 1 and proceeding 10, then mathematically I’ll never reach 10. That is, if the universe is truly infinite then the present shouldn’t be happening, because the series of events prior to it is infinite. For instance, a man claims he has been counting down from infinity. He reaches 0 today, but we can never really say (a) when he began to count or (b) why he didn’t finish yesterday, last year, or 100 years ago. If a thing is infinite, then the events coming after the infinite events should never actualize.

Material simply cannot be stagnant. It is always moving due to energy. Thus, for material to come about, there must always be a series of events prior to that material. Material M1 requires cause C. In order from M1 to move or become M2, it requires C. Thus, for M1 to get to M2, C must be present. However, M1 required M0, M(-1), M(-2), and so on. C was required for all of these. So if material is infinite, then it runs into the problem I listed above.

God, however, is not material and does not require a cause. That is what the premise stated – anything that begins to exist has a cause. God did not begin to exist because, being immaterial, does not have an existence contingent upon space and time. Material existence is contingent upon space and time, thus running into a problem when we begin to speak of “infinite” or “eternal.” God’s existence isn’t contingent upon space and time, so the problem doesn’t come up.

Issue 12 – Doesn’t a belief in a creator God lead to irrational beliefs?

Me:

That’s a bit childish. Everyone knows the universe exists. Even Hindus, who’s entire belief system is based on the physical world not existing, will not drink rat poison nor will he leap of tall buildings in an attempt to fly. We can believe all we want that the universe doesn’t exist, but we all know that if we perform action A will be end up with consequence B.

Atheist:

But in a universe where supreme creator beings exist (yours) then how do you know God didn’t just create everything 10 seconds ago? You don’t.

Me:

If you presuppose the answer, why ask the question?

Regardless, we know a priori that existence didn’t just come into being a few seconds ago. There is a long complex argument that goes with it, but it boils down to the nature of God. From what we know about the nature of God, historical knowledge, free will, and a whole host of other things – not to mention our own a priori intuition – it’s illogical to believe everything came about 10 seconds ago.

Furthermore, such an argument is a red herring. Even if a belief in God allowed for the belief that everything came into existence 10 seconds ago, this does absolutely nothing to prove that naturalism is a better or more true alternative. All it does it show that we are open to some weird options – it says nothing about the validity of naturalism. This too is a logical fallacy – by appealing the consequence or potential consequence of the belief, you’re only pointing out that weird beliefs will be allowed. It says nothing in favor of naturalism, which we already know to be mathematically, scientifically, and logically absurd.

Here was my response:

Issue 1 – Kalam Cosmological Argument

Me:

1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Atheist:

Why do you assume that the universe had a cause?

“Our” universe came into being however many billions of years ago, but who is to say what was there before. The matter within this universe could have always existed, just not necessarily in its current form.

Me:

It is necessarily true that in any universe where matter decays it must also have a beginning. Thus, even if we say there was something prior to the universe, we’re still left with the problem of infinite regress – at some point, there has to be something beginning everything.

Regardless, mathematically the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem shows that all energy, matter, time, and space came into existence at the Big Bang – that is, it didn’t use anything else.

Philosophically, however, an infinite universe under a naturalistic understanding is simply impossible. Based on the following syllogism:

1) An actually infinite number of things cannot exist
2) A beginningless series of events in time entails an actually infinite number of things.
3) Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.

We all know that the Big Bang is a series of events, or at least begins a series of events and – under your argument – was preceded by a series of events. The problem with this is that it’s mathematically impossible. If I want to get from 1-10, but there is an infinite number of events preceding 1 and proceeding 10, then mathematically I’ll never reach 10. That is, if the universe is truly infinite then the present shouldn’t be happening, because the series of events prior to it is infinite. For instance, a man claims he has been counting down from infinity. He reaches 0 today, but we can never really say (a) when he began to count or (b) why he didn’t finish yesterday, last year, or 100 years ago. If a thing is infinite, then the events coming after the infinite events should never actualize.

The bigger problem is that scientifically this can’t work. Due to thermodynamics, an infinite universe should already be dead. According to the second law of thermodynamics, a closed system will always tend toward a state of equilibrium. Unless there is energy being constantly pumped into the closed system, the energy will eventually be evenly distributed. This is why if you are in a closed room with no ventilation, the temperature will be the same in every part of the room. If you begin to pump in air then the temperature will lose its state of equilibrium.

This, of course, forces us to ponder why there is no state of equilibrium in the universe if the universe is eternal. At some point all the energy should ether lead to equal heat or equal cold – regardless of which extreme it goes to, the temperature of the universe should be the same everywhere. Yet, it’s not; this is impossible in an infinite universe. In short, the universe should be “winding down” as it reaches its equilibrium, indicating that it had to be “wound up” at some point.

So yes, it is necessarily true that the universe has a finite beginning point in which time, matter, energy, etc came into existence.

Issue 2 – Do things that exist have an explanation and/or cause?

Me:

If we combine this with Leibnizian cosmology:

1) Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.

Atheist:

If God exists then what is his explanation? If God can have special rules that allow him to be exempt from whatever rules you give the universe…why can’t the origins of the universe have those same exceptions?

Me:

That’s really an absurd argument. It ignores the premise given – everything that has a cause began to exist. Or, everything that began to exist has a cause.

It’s like asking, “what’s the name of that bachelor’s wife?” If the universe requires a beginning, then it requires an immaterial, eternal, all-knowing, all-powerful mind to bring the physical world about. All of these would be part of the nature of the being that caused the universe, thus satisfying the requirement of premise (1). The universe, as it is, fits none of the above descriptors, thus requiring an explanation.

Issue 3 – How do we define God?

Me:

2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

Athiest:

Wouldn’t you actually need to define what you mean by God?

Me:

God is the maximally great being.

Issue 4 – Does the universe exist?

Me:

The universe exists.

Atheist:

…But does it….

Me:

That’s a bit childish. Everyone knows the universe exists. Even Hindus, who’s entire belief system is based on the physical world not existing, will not drink rat poison nor will he leap of tall buildings in an attempt to fly. We can believe all we want that the universe doesn’t exist, but we all know that if we perform action A will be end up with consequence B.

Issue 5 – Does the universe have an explanation for its existence?

Me:

4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.

Atheist:

If it does have an explanation of its existence (and it would be great to know) it could be entirely due to natural rules governing the universe, why do theists need to invoke a divine creator?

Me:

As shown by the examples I gave from mathematics and physics, it’s quite impossible. Due to naturalism requiring a physical reality, we would end up in an infinite regress and/or circular argumentation in order to substantiate that the Big Bang was caused by natural forces. Even if we can concede this point (which ignores that in the Big Bang, time and space came into existence), we must point back further and ask for the cause of the other physical cause.

So a naturalistic argument ends in an illogical infinite regress – mathematically (as shown previously) it is impossible.

Issue 6 – Does the cosmological argument prove the Christian God?

Atheist:

Even if we grant all of the above premises, and we come to the conclusion that “God” exists (and by God I mean Divine Creator), how do you move on from there to Yahweh? Why could this creator being not be Buddha? or Allah or Gaia or Odin?

Me:

It doesn’t, what of it? If anything, my belief in the Christian God still leaves me in a far more intellectually satisfying position than the atheist.

Regardless, the ontological argument is simply one argument in many for the Christian God. When coupled with multiple other arguments, you can justify a belief in the Christian God.

However, the question you ask is very irrelevant as the ontological argument doesn’t seek to prove the personality of this God, merely that He exists.

Atheist:

Surely that argument at best states that a deistic deity exists?

My Reply:

Yeah, and…?

Again – this still leaves the atheist (you) in a horrible situation because your entire belief is based upon there not being a God. If you concede, “Yes, but I’m just a Deist” you’re still closer to the Christian faith than you are to atheism. Deism is actually a Christian heresy, not an atheistic one. So to accept Deism still puts you in the theist camp, which is a long shot away from Christianity.

1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

If we combine this with Leibnizian cosmology:

1) Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3) The universe exists.
4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence.
5) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God.

If I remember correctly, Leibnitz is assuming that Aquinas is correct in saying that the “unmoved mover” is what people call “God.”